Honesty
The public deserves to see every assumption, every risk, and every trade-off. This framework uses low, base, and high scenarios because no honest 25-year model produces one exact number.
A FULLY COSTED
25-YEAR FRAMEWORK
LONG LIVE
THE AGE OF
PROSPERITY
No magic money.
No hidden offsets.
No fake certainty.
This is not a one-year budget trick. It is a 25-year reconstruction program.
The Fiscal Philosophy
The public deserves to see every assumption, every risk, and every trade-off. This framework uses low, base, and high scenarios because no honest 25-year model produces one exact number.
More than half of the platform's net cost sits in productive capital and public asset buildout: housing, utilities, factories, infrastructure, and resilience systems that last.
Money that stays and circulates in Saskatchewan generates more local wealth than money extracted to distant shareholders. The SFG, credit unions, Crown Corporations, and SaskBonds are designed to keep more of that circulation within Saskatchewan.
The Saskatchewan Sovereignty Fund preserves resource wealth for future generations, and long-lived capital projects are financed across the decades of benefit they deliver. The SSF is not a political reserve account.
The peak year is not the permanent year. The platform is front-loaded in cost and back-loaded in return, with capital intensity falling and recovery channels deepening over time.
The Revenue Package
Yes. This framework includes explicit tax increases. They are not left as vague future budget choices. The package is legislated in Year 1, with PST, PIT, and CIT taking effect in Year 2 and the Energy Veterans levy in Year 1.
| Revenue Measure | Change | Effective Model Year | 25-Year Gross Gain |
|---|---|---|---|
| PST | 6% to 8% | 2 | C$26.65B |
| PIT | New five-bracket structure | 2 | C$9.49B |
| CIT | Retain 1% small-business rate; 14% / 15% / 16% on larger corporate bands | 2 | C$7.73B |
| Energy Veterans levy | 2.5% sector transition levy on specified Saskatchewan O&G revenues | 1 | C$3.72B |
| Gross package total | C$47.58B | ||
| Net additional revenue counted in the whole-platform balance model | C$46.88B |
| Taxable Income | Current Rate | New Rate | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| $0 - $53,462 | 10.5% | 11.5% | +1.0% |
| $53,462 - $99,287 | 12.5% | 13.5% | +1.0% |
| $99,287 - $200,000 | 14.5% | 16.0% | +1.5% |
| $200,000 - $500,000 | 14.5% | 17.0% | +2.5% |
| $500,000+ | 14.5% | 18.0% | +3.5% |
| Business Limit | Current Rate | New Rate | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| $0 - $600,000* | 1% | 1% | 0% |
| $600,000 - $1,200,000* | 12% | 12% | 0% |
| $1,200,000 - $10,000,000 | 12% | 14% | +2.0% |
| $10,000,000 - $100,000,000 | 12% | 15% | +3.0% |
| $100,000,000 + | 12% | 16% | +4.0% |
PIT and CIT thresholds are CPI-indexed in real terms inside this constant-2026-dollar model. No separate PST relief package is modelled here. This is a broad revenue package because the platform it funds is broad.
The Cost Profile
On the current model, the Saskatchewan 21 Policies carry a 25-year net cost of approximately C$181.89B in the base case. The low case is approximately C$120.71B. The high case is approximately C$282.72B.
| Scenario | 25-Year Net Cost | Peak Annual Cost | Peak Year | Year-25 Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | C$120.71B | C$5.82B | 10 | C$4.60B |
| Base | C$181.89B | C$8.94B | 10 | C$6.47B |
| High | C$282.72B | C$14.44B | 10 | C$9.15B |
| Cost Type | Low | Base | High | Base Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| One-Time Setup | C$1.53B | C$2.08B | C$3.22B | 1.15% |
| Gross Capital | C$64.24B | C$105.43B | C$175.39B | 57.96% |
| Gross Operating | C$104.89B | C$151.17B | C$235.53B | 83.11% |
| Modeled Offsets | (C$49.96B) | (C$76.79B) | (C$131.42B) | (42.22%) |
| Net Platform Cost | C$120.71B | C$181.89B | C$282.72B | 100.00% |
These numbers describe a long-horizon mix of one-time setup costs, capital buildout, operating expansion, and already-modeled offsets. They are not one giant undifferentiated call on the General Revenue Fund.
Where The Pressure Sits
Fiscal Character and Major Cost Drivers
Most of the platform cost is concentrated in a small number of very large state-building projects. It is not 21 equal-cost promises piled on top of each other.
Housing, utilities, factories, resilience infrastructure, digital systems, and other long-lived public assets that either lower future costs or create long-run revenue capacity.
Core program expansion in health, education, income security, labour standards, reconciliation, public safety, and democratic institutions.
Policies 05, 03, 15, and 12 dominate the fiscal picture. That is where the real argument is.
Housing Crisis: C$40.95B. Universal Health: C$34.15B. Resource and Energy Sovereignty: C$30.90B. Lifelong Learning: C$23.75B.
When The Money Flows
The peak year is not the permanent year. Early rollout costs are not the mature-state costs.
| Period | Low Avg Annual | Base Avg Annual | High Avg Annual | What Is Happening |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Years 1-5 | C$3.34B | C$5.27B | C$8.67B | Legal setup, institutional creation, early rollout, early capital mobilization. |
| Years 6-10 | C$5.35B | C$8.28B | C$13.43B | Main peak buildout period. |
| Years 11-15 | C$5.52B | C$8.42B | C$13.25B | Heavy but more mature system expansion. |
| Years 16-20 | C$5.33B | C$7.94B | C$12.05B | Capital taper begins, recoveries deepen, large systems mature. |
| Years 21-25 | C$4.61B | C$6.47B | C$9.15B | Mature-state operating profile with lower capital intensity. |
The first decade is the hardest. That is why the platform must be judged as a 25-year restructuring program, not a one-year budget shock.
How It Is Funded
Funding Lanes
Because the platform is not one kind of spending, it cannot be funded through one kind of revenue. Policy 21 uses separate funding lanes, each matched to the fiscal character of what it funds.
Income security, health operations, education operations, public administration, labour enforcement, democracy, reconciliation, and safety, financed through income taxes, PST, federal transfers, and ordinary provincial revenue.
The Universal Health Levy, transition levies, resource royalties, windfall levies, dormant lease taxes, and value-add levies tied directly to the sectors or systems being expanded.
Thermal networks, utility systems, grid expansion, and digital hosting infrastructure financed with Crown borrowing, utility debt, on-bill recovery, electricity sales, and service charges.
Public housing, factories, resilience retrofits, grocery and logistics assets, and other long-lived public capital.
Rents, thermal-service charges, contract revenue, vendor savings, utility revenue, and public-enterprise sales that lower long-run net cost.
The SSF and SFG are balance-sheet architecture, not ordinary day-to-day program financing.
Expanded Canada Health Transfers and infrastructure, resilience, and reconciliation support where available, though the current model remains conservative about additional federal participation.
Policy 21 now sets out an explicit general-revenue package: PST at 8%, a new five-bracket PIT schedule, a stepped CIT schedule that preserves the 1% small-business rate, and a 2.5% Energy Veterans sector transition levy. Gross 25-year revenue from that package is C$47.58B, with C$46.88B counted in the whole-platform balance model after the levy allowance already embedded in Policy 10.
The Capital Budget
SaskBonds and Productive Debt
The capital budget should be treated separately from the operating budget. Long-lived public assets should be financed on long horizons that match the duration of the assets they create.
This is the logic of productive debt. Housing stock, thermal systems, grid assets, resilience retrofits, digital infrastructure, factories, and logistics systems are not routine operating deficits. They are assets that lower future costs, create recoverable revenue, or increase the province's durable productive capacity.
| Policy | Base Gross Capital | Main Vehicle | Primary Recovery | Staging Logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 - Resource and Energy Sovereignty | C$45.85B | Crown / utility borrowing, staged public capital | Royalties, electricity sales, rate-backed recovery, public ownership earnings | Reactors, grid expansion, and major energy buildout phased and gated |
| 05 - Housing Crisis | C$37.85B | SaskBonds and SHC borrowing | Rent revenue retained in the housing system | Housing buildout spread across the full horizon |
| 06 - Connected Communities | C$10.55B | Utility borrowing and municipal co-funding | Thermal-service charges and cost-sharing | Thermal networks and municipal buildout proceed in phases |
| 20 - Disaster Resilience | C$3.58B | SaskBonds and SPSA capital programs | Limited federal cost-sharing and avoided-loss logic | Staged by risk and facility type |
| 19 - Manufacturing | C$3.06B | SaskBonds and Crown capital | Internal demand, sales, and processing margins | Factories sequenced by supply-chain readiness |
| 16 - Digital Sovereignty | C$2.44B | Crown capital and SaskTel capital plan | Vendor savings, shared-service recovery, hosting recovery | Migration paced to avoid disruption |
| 14 - Food Sovereignty | C$1.88B | SaskBonds and Crown capital | Grocery margins, lease repayments, and logistics recovery | Phased regional rollout |
The base model does not assume SSF first-loss tranches, guaranteed ratings, or one identical bond structure across every asset class. Major buildouts proceed in phases tied to readiness, workforce capacity, supply chains, business cases, and public need.
Debt Service
The platform should be read in two ways at once. The direct-capital view shows the full scale of what gets built. The debt-service view shows the annual pressure a government would actually face if eligible capital is financed over time.
| Measure | Direct-Capital View | Debt-Service View |
|---|---|---|
| Peak annual fiscal pressure | C$8.94B | C$7.36B |
| Peak year | Year 10 | Year 25 |
| Year-25 annual fiscal pressure | C$6.47B | C$7.36B |
| 25-year total inside horizon | C$181.89B | C$134.67B |
| Financed capital issuance | n/a | C$106.13B |
| Year-25 debt-service component | n/a | C$4.53B |
| Debt-service tail after 2051 | n/a | C$83.61B through 2076 |
Debt financing lowers the first-25-year cash burden materially, but it does not make the platform cheap. It replaces large early capital outlays with a long financing tail, and the later years still carry both a substantial operating state and accumulated debt service.
| Measure | Direct-Capital View | Debt-Service View |
|---|---|---|
| Year-25 platform-only gap before explicit tax package | C$6.47B | C$7.36B |
| Year-25 platform-only gap after explicit tax package | C$4.64B | C$5.53B |
The cost views do not tell the whole story on their own. Policy 21 also includes an explicit general-revenue package that raises about C$2.22B in Year 2 and about C$1.83B in Year 25, all in constant 2026 dollars.
Balance Math
Does It Balance?
With the explicit tax package included, the answer becomes more nuanced. The package materially narrows the gap, but it does not fully close it on the platform-only case. Once broader growth and feedback assumptions are added, annual balance returns materially earlier than under the tax-free platform-only case.
| Scenario | Additional Assumption | Direct Annual Balance | Direct Cumulative Payback | Direct Year-25 Position | Debt-Service Annual Balance | Debt-Service Cumulative Payback | Debt-Service Year-25 Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform-only | Explicit tax package only; no added growth or extra feedbacks beyond the hard model | Not within horizon | Not within horizon | -C$4.64B | Not within horizon | Not within horizon | -C$5.53B |
| Moderate balance path | Explicit tax package plus 1.0% annual real fiscal-capacity growth and feedbacks ramping to C$1.0B/year by 2051 | 2047 | 2063 | +C$2.32B | 2028 | 2052 | +C$1.43B |
| Transformation path | Explicit tax package plus 1.25% annual real fiscal-capacity growth and feedbacks ramping to C$2.5B/year by 2051 | 2043 | 2053 | +C$5.55B | 2028 | 2037 | +C$4.65B |
That does not mean the platform suddenly pays for itself. It means the balance picture improves sharply once the tax side is modelled honestly. In the debt-service view, annual balance returns much earlier than cumulative payback.
Already In The Model
Direct Offsets and Recovery Channels
The current base case already includes C$76.79B in modeled offsets and recoveries over 25 years. This is not a pure gross-spend number.
| Policy | Offset Source | 25-Year Base Value | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 02 - Saskatchewan Social Security | Current provincial programs replaced by SSS | (C$17.30B) | Baseline program replacement |
| 03 - Universal Health | Universal Health Levy | (C$13.33B) | Dedicated levy |
| 05 - Housing Crisis | SaskHomes tenant rent revenue | (C$13.50B) | User revenue |
| 06 - Connected Communities | Thermal-service and on-bill capital recovery | (C$2.48B) | Utility recovery |
| 06 - Connected Communities | Municipal and federal infrastructure cost-sharing | (C$1.01B) | External cost-sharing |
| 07 - Public Safety | Redirected Saskatchewan Marshals funding | (C$0.50B) | Program redirection |
| 10 - Energy Veterans | Conservative levy allowance already counted inside Policy 10 net costing | (C$0.70B) | Dedicated levy allowance |
| 11 - Century Corps | Contract revenue from Standing Master Agreements | (C$3.45B) | Contract recovery |
| 13 - Climate Crossroads | Fossil-fuel subsidy and incentive termination savings | (C$0.60B) | Spending reduction |
| 15 - Resource and Energy Sovereignty | Incremental royalty, windfall levy, dormant lease, and value-add revenues | (C$13.50B) | Dedicated resource revenue |
| 15 - Resource and Energy Sovereignty | Expanded electricity sales and rate-backed recovery | (C$2.85B) | Utility recovery |
| 15 - Resource and Energy Sovereignty | Early public-ownership dividends and equity earnings | (C$2.70B) | Enterprise revenue |
| 16 - Digital Sovereignty | Reduced external vendor spend and platform consolidation savings | (C$1.00B) | Vendor savings |
| 17 - Financial Sovereignty | SFG treasury income, wholesale spreads, and service-fee recovery | (C$0.66B) | Treasury / financial recovery |
| 20 - Disaster Resilience | Federal resilience and mitigation cost-sharing | (C$0.84B) | External cost-sharing |
| Total | All modeled offsets and recoveries already counted in the base case | (C$76.79B) | Net modeled offsets |
These offsets are not fantasy numbers pulled from general optimism. They come from explicit policy mechanisms already written into the platform, and the Policy 10 levy row is only the allowance already embedded in that policy's own net cost.
Secondary Returns
What The Model Does Not Overclaim
Policy 21 separates hard offsets from slower feedback effects. Poverty reduction, preventive care, stronger education, lower household costs, and local value capture all matter. They just do not all belong in the base case.
Saskatchewan Social Security, Universal Health, Housing, Public Safety, Fair Labour, Lifelong Learning, Food Sovereignty, Manufacturing, and Disaster Resilience all create plausible long-run savings that are real but harder to time precisely.
Social Security, public housing, connected communities, universal health, food sovereignty, and fair labour lower the unavoidable monthly costs that make households poor, unstable, and unable to participate fully in the economy.
Co-operatives, food sovereignty, resource and energy sovereignty, digital sovereignty, financial sovereignty, and manufacturing reduce leakage by keeping more ownership, more margins, more data control, and more public revenue inside Saskatchewan.
Climate lawsuit success, stronger in-migration, stronger public-enterprise performance, and larger productivity gains are treated as upside scenarios rather than being smuggled into the core math.
Guardrails
Fiscal Safeguards
The platform is large, ambitious, and long-running. It needs rules that prevent drift, overclaiming, and fiscal disorder.
The platform does not rely on climate lawsuit winnings to make the core math work. Any recovery is treated as non-core upside.
The SSF principal cannot be accessed, and the disbursement formula cannot be changed, without a two-thirds supermajority vote in the Legislature.
Combined marginal effective tax rates must not exceed 55% at any income level. Annual publication is required.
Every SaskBond series must publish annual allocation reports showing exactly where every dollar was spent, with second-party opinions required for each series.
Each new Crown Corporation must publish quarterly financial dashboards and face annual independent performance reviews.
GRF operating expansion, Crown capital investment, utility borrowing, rate-backed recovery systems, and intergenerational wealth architecture must always be reported separately.
The SME Transition Grants, Energy Veterans Transition Levy, and Oil and Gas operational licences automatically sunset as specified in their policies.
Reactors, major grid works, factory buildouts, and other large projects proceed through decision gates instead of being treated as all-or-nothing instant obligations.
The Minister of Finance must publish annual debt-to-GDP, debt-service-to-revenue, and capital-borrowing trajectories, along with a corrective plan when the Province materially departs from the published path.
A full PBO-style fiscal update must be published annually, with updated 25-year projections and a full model refresh every five years.
Questions & Answers
Partly by taxing more, and saying so openly. Policy 21 explicitly models an 8% PST, a new five-bracket PIT schedule, higher CIT rates on larger firms while preserving the 1% small-business rate, and a 2.5% Energy Veterans levy, alongside the Universal Health Levy, stronger resource revenue capture, long-dated capital borrowing, and conservative public-system recoveries. Over 25 years that package adds about C$47.58B gross, or C$46.88B of additional whole-platform revenue after accounting for the levy allowance already built into Policy 10's own net cost. This is a long-horizon restructuring program, not a one-year budget trick.
We are building a healthier, better-educated, better-housed workforce, connected by stronger infrastructure, powered by abundant energy, and backed by public and local financial institutions that keep more capital circulating here. Some employers will face higher costs in the short term, but the transition grants, stronger consumer demand, better worker retention, and improved infrastructure are designed to make Saskatchewan a more attractive place to invest over time.
The entire fiscal model is built without a single dollar of lawsuit proceeds. If the lawsuit produces nothing, nothing changes. If it produces anything, it is all upside flowing directly to the SSF.
Saskatchewan's capital borrowing funds homes, factories, nuclear reactors, and infrastructure that build real public assets. Unlike consumption debt, productive debt finances systems that lower future costs, create recoveries, or expand the province's long-run productive capacity. SaskBonds are meant to be transparent, staged, and tied to specific asset classes rather than treated as a blank cheque. Annual debt and debt-service reporting is what keeps that borrowing disciplined.
Even with the explicit tax package, not on the platform-only case. By 2051 the remaining gap is about C$4.64B in the direct-capital view and about C$5.53B in the debt-service view. Once broader growth and feedback assumptions are layered in, annual balance returns in 2047 on the moderate direct path and 2043 on the transformation direct path. In the debt-service view, annual balance returns as early as 2028 on both the moderate and transformation paths because the new revenue package arrives faster than the debt-service tail. Cumulative payback still takes longer.
The base case is already conservative about long-run resource revenue, and the platform deliberately diversifies both its revenue base and its economic base. It does not depend on one commodity or one price window to stay viable. Phased capital commitments and diversified public revenue streams are the main protection against commodity volatility.
Because no honest 25-year projection produces one exact number. The low, base, and high cases exist because construction costs, uptake rates, delivery pace, workforce constraints, and revenue recovery are genuinely uncertain. Ranges are not a sign of weakness. They are a sign that the costing model is trying to be real rather than pretending to know what it cannot.
The Destination
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